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Syllabus
After petitioner university denied tenure to associate professor
Rosalie Tung, she filed a charge with respondent Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) alleging discrimination on the basis
of race, sex, and national origin in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964. In the course of its investigation, the EEOC issued
a subpoena seeking, inter alia, Tung's tenure-review file and the
tenure files of five male faculty members identified in the charge as
having received more favorable treatment than Tung. Petitioner
refused to produce a number of the tenure file documents and
applied to the EEOC for modification of the subpoena to exclude
what it termed "confidential peer review information." The EEOC
denied the application and successfully sought enforcement of the
subpoena by the District Court. The Court of Appeals affirmed,
rejecting petitioner's claim that policy considerations and First
Amendment principles of academic freedom required the recognition
of a qualified privilege or the adoption of a balancing approach that
would require the EEOC to demonstrate some particularized need,
beyond a showing of relevance, to obtain peer review materials.
Held: A university does not enjoy a special privilege requiring a
judicial finding of particularized necessity of access, beyond a
showing of mere relevance, before peer review materials pertinent to
charges of discrimination in tenure decisions are disclosed to the
EEOC. 493 U. S. 188-202.
(a) The claimed privilege cannot be grounded in the common law
under Federal Rule of Evidence 501. This Court is reluctant to
recognize petitioner's asserted privilege where it appears that
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/58
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Congress, in expressly extending Title VII's coverage to educational
institutions in 1972 and in thereafter continuing to afford the EEOC a
broad right of access to any evidence "relevant" to a charge under
investigation, balanced the substantial costs of invidious
discrimination in institutions of higher learning against the
importance of academic autonomy, but did not see fit to create a
privilege for peer review documents. In fact, Congress did provide a
modicum of protection for an employer's interest in the
confidentiality of its records by making it a crime for EEOC
employees to publicize before the institution of court proceedings
materials obtained during investigations. Petitioner has not offered
persuasive
Page 493 U. S. 183
justification for its claim that this Court should go further than
Congress thought necessary to safeguard confidentiality. Disclosure
of peer review materials will often be necessary in order for the
EEOC to determine whether illegal discrimination has taken place.
Moreover, the adoption of a requirement that the EEOC demonstrate
a specific reason for disclosure, beyond a showing of relevance,
would place a substantial litigation-producing obstacle in the EEOC's
way and give universities a weapon to frustrate investigations. It
would also lead to a wave of similar privilege claims by other
employers, such as writers, publishers, musicians, and lawyers, who
play significant roles in furthering speech and learning in society.
Furthermore, petitioner's claim is not supported by this Court's
precedents recognizing qualified privileges for Presidential and grand
and petit jury communications and for deliberative intra-agency
documents, since a privilege for peer review materials lacks a
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historical, constitutional, or statutory basis similar to that of those
privileges. 493 U. S. 188-195.
(b) Nor can the claimed privilege be grounded in First Amendment
"academic freedom." Petitioner's reliance on this Court's so-called
academic freedom cases is somewhat misplaced, since, in invalidating
various governmental actions, those cases dealt with attempts to
control university speech that were content-based and that
constituted a direct infringement on the asserted right to determine
on academic grounds who could teach. In contrast, petitioner here
does not allege any content-based regulation, but only that the
"quality of instruction and scholarship [will] decline" as a result of
the burden EEOC subpoenas place on the peer review process. The
subpoena at issue does not provide criteria that petitioner must use
in selecting teachers, or prevent it from using any such criteria other
than those prescribed by Title VII, and therefore respects legitimate
academic decisionmaking. In any event, the First Amendment does
not embrace petitioner's claim to the effect that the right of academic
freedom derived from the cases relied on should be expanded to
protect confidential peer review materials from disclosure. By
comparison with cases in which the Court has recognized a First
Amendment right, the complained-of infringement is extremely
attenuated, in that the burden of such disclosure is far removed from
the asserted right, and, if petitioner's claim were accepted, many
other generally applicable laws, such as tax laws, might be said to
infringe the First Amendment to the extent they affected university
hiring. In addition, the claimed injury to academic freedom is
speculative, since confidentiality is not the norm in all peer review
systems, and since some disclosure of peer evaluations would take
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place even if the "special necessity" test were adopted. Moreover, this
Court will not assume that most evaluators will become less candid if
the possibility of disclosure increases.
Page 493 U. S. 184
This case is in many respects similar to Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.
S. 665, where, in rejecting the contention that the First Amendment
prohibited requiring a reporter to testify as to information obtained
in confidence without a special showing that such testimony was
necessary, the Court declared that the Amendment does not
invalidate every incidental burdening of the press that may result
from the enforcement of generally applicable laws, id. at 682, and
indicated a reluctance to recognize a constitutional privilege of
uncertain effect and scope, id. at 693, 703. Pp. 493 U. S. 195-202.
850 F.2d 969 (CA3 1988), affirmed.
BLACKMUN, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.
Justice BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
In this case we are asked to decide whether a university enjoys a
special privilege, grounded in either the common law or the First
Amendment, against disclosure of peer review materials that are
relevant to charges of racial or sexual discrimination in tenure
decisions.
Page 493 U. S. 185
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The University of Pennsylvania, petitioner here, is a private
institution. It currently operates 12 schools, including the Wharton
School of Business, which collectively enroll approximately 18,000
full-time students.
In 1985, the University denied tenure to Rosalie Tung, an associate
professor on the Wharton faculty. Tung then filed a sworn charge of
discrimination with respondent Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC or Commission). App. 23. As subsequently
amended, the charge alleged that Tung was the victim of
discrimination on the basis of race, sex, and national origin, in
violation of § 703(a) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), 78 Stat. 255, as amended, which makes it
unlawful
"to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."
In her charge, Tung stated that the Department Chairman had
sexually harassed her and that, in her belief, after she insisted that
their relationship remain professional, he had submitted a negative
letter to the University's Personnel Committee which possessed
ultimate responsibility for tenure decisions. She also alleged that her
qualifications were "equal to or better than" those of five named male
faculty members who had received more favorable treatment. Tung
noted that the majority of the members of her Department had
recommended her for tenure, and stated that she had been given no
reason for the decision against her, but had discovered of her own
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/58
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efforts that the Personnel Committee had attempted to justify its
decision "on the ground that the Wharton School is not interested in
China-related research." App. 29. This explanation, Tung's charge
alleged, was a pretext for discrimination: "simply their way of saying
they do not want a Chinese-American, Oriental woman in their
school." Ibid.
Page 493 U. S. 186
The Commission undertook an investigation into Tung's charge, and
requested a variety of relevant information from petitioner. When the
University refused to provide certain of that information, the
Commission's Acting District Director issued a subpoena seeking,
among other things, Tung's tenure-review file and the tenure files of
the five male faculty members identified in the charge. Id. at 21.
Petitioner refused to produce a number of the tenure-file documents.
It applied to the Commission for modification of the subpoena to
exclude what it termed "confidential peer review information,"
specifically, (1) confidential letters written by Tung's evaluators; (2)
the Department Chairman's letter of evaluation; (3) documents
reflecting the internal deliberations of faculty committees considering
applications for tenure, including the Department Evaluation Report
summarizing the deliberations relating to Tung's application for
tenure; and (4) comparable portions of the tenure-review files of the
five males. The University urged the Commission to "adopt a
balancing approach reflecting the constitutional and societal interest
inherent in the peer review process" and to resort to "all feasible
methods to minimize the intrusive effects of its investigations."
Exhibit 2 to EEOC's Memorandum in Support of Application for
Order to Show Cause.
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The Commission denied the University's application. It concluded
that the withheld documents were needed in order to determine the
merit of Tung's charges. The Commission found:
"There has not been enough data supplied in order for the
Commission to determine whether there is reasonable cause to
believe that the allegations of sex, race and national origin
discrimination is true."
App. to Pet. for Cert. A31. The Commission rejected petitioner's
contention that a letter, which set forth the Personnel Committee's
reasons for denying Tung tenure, was sufficient for disposition of the
charge. "The Commission would fall short of its obligation" to
investigate charges of discrimination, the EEOC's order
Page 493 U. S. 187
stated,
"if it stopped its investigation once [the employer] has . . . provided
the reasons for its employment decisions, without verifying whether
that reason is a pretext for discrimination."
Id. at A32. The Commission also rejected petitioner's proposed
balancing test, explaining that "such an approach in the instant case .
. . would impair the Commission's ability to fully investigate this
charge of discrimination." Id. at A33. The Commission indicated that
enforcement proceedings might be necessary if a response was not
forthcoming within 20 days. Ibid.
The University continued to withhold the tenure-review materials.
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The Commission then applied to the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Pennsylvania for enforcement of its subpoena.
The court entered a brief enforcement order. [Footnote 1] Id. at A35.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the enforcement
decision. 850 F.2d 969 (1988). [Footnote 2] Relying upon its earlier
opinion in EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College,
Page 493 U. S. 188
775 F.2d 110 (1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1163 (1986), the court
rejected petitioner's claim that policy considerations and First
Amendment principles of academic freedom required the recognition
of a qualified privilege or the adoption of a balancing approach that
would require the Commission to demonstrate some particularized
need, beyond a showing of relevance, to obtain peer review materials.
Because of what might be thought of as a conflict in approach with
the Seventh Circuit's decision in EEOC v. University of Notre Dame
du Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 337 (1983), and because of the importance of
the issue, we granted certiorari limited to the compelled-disclosure
question. 490.S. 1015.

As it had done before the Commission, the District Court, and the
Court of Appeals, the University raises here essentially two claims.
First, it urges us to recognize a qualified common law privilege
against disclosure of confidential peer review materials. Second, it
asserts a First Amendment right of "academic freedom" against
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wholesale disclosure of the contested documents. With respect to
each of the two claims, the remedy petitioner seeks is the same: a
requirement of a judicial finding of particularized necessity of access,
beyond a showing of mere relevance, before peer review materials
are disclosed to the Commission.
Petitioner's common law privilege claim is grounded in Federal Rule
of Evidence 501. This provides in relevant part:
"Except as otherwise required by the Constitution . . . or provided by
Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court . . . , the
privilege of a witness . . . shall be governed by the principles of the
common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United
States in the light of reason and experience.
Page 493 U. S. 189
The University asks us to invoke this provision to fashion a new
privilege that it claims is necessary to protect the integrity of the peer
review process, which in turn is central to the proper functioning of
many colleges and universities. These institutions are special,
observes petitioner, because they function as 'centers of learning,
innovation and discovery.' Brief for Petitioner 24."
We do not create and apply an evidentiary privilege unless it
"promotes sufficiently important interests to outweigh the need for
probative evidence. . . . " Trammel v. United States, 445 U. S. 40, 445
U. S. 51 (1980). Inasmuch as "[t]estimonial exclusionary rules and
privileges contravene the fundamental principle that the public . . .
has a right to every man's evidence,'" id. at 445 U. S. 50, quoting
United States v. Bryan, 339 U. S. 323, 339 U. S. 331 (1950), any such
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/58
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privilege must "be strictly construed." 445 U.S. at 445 U. S. 50.
Moreover, although Rule 501 manifests a congressional desire "not to
freeze the law of privilege" but rather to provide the courts with
flexibility to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis, id. at
445 U.S. at 445 U. S. 47, we are disinclined to exercise this authority
expansively. We are especially reluctant to recognize a privilege in an
area where it appears that Congress has considered the relevant
competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself. Cf.
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 408 U. S. 706 (1972). The
balancing of conflicting interests of this type is particularly a
legislative function.
With all this in mind, we cannot accept the University's invitation to
create a new privilege against the disclosure of peer review materials.
We begin by noting that Congress, in extending Title VII to
educational institutions and in providing for broad EEOC subpoena
powers, did not see fit to create a privilege for peer review
documents.
When Title VII was enacted originally in 1964, it exempted an
"educational institution with respect to the employment of
individuals to perform work connected with the educational
Page 493 U. S. 190
activities of such institution."
§ 702, 78 Stat. 255. Eight years later, Congress eliminated that
specific exemption by enacting § 3 of the Equal Employment
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Opportunity Act of 1972, 86 Stat 103. This extension of Title VII was
Congress' considered response to the widespread and compelling
problem of invidious discrimination in educational institutions. The
House Report focused specifically on discrimination in higher
education, including the lack of access for women and minorities to
higher ranking (i.e., tenured) academic positions. See H.R.Rep. No.
92238, pp. 19-20 (1971), U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News 1972, pp.
2137, 2154-2155. Significantly, opponents of the extension claimed
that enforcement of Title VII would weaken institutions of higher
education by interfering with decisions to hire and promote faculty
members. [Footnote 3] Petitioner therefore cannot seriously contend
that Congress was oblivious to concerns of academic autonomy when
it abandoned the exemption for educational institutions.
The effect of the elimination of this exemption was to expose tenure
determinations to the same enforcement procedures applicable to
other employment decisions. This Court previously has observed that
Title VII
"sets forth 'an integrated, multistep enforcement procedure' that
enables the Commission to detect and remedy instances of
discrimination."
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U. S. 54, 466 U. S. 62 (1984), quoting
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U. S. 355, 432 U. S. 359 (1977).
The Commission's enforcement responsibilities are triggered by the
filing of a specific sworn charge of discrimination. The Act obligates
the Commission to investigate a charge of discrimination to
determine whether there is "reasonable cause to believe that the
charge is true." § 2000e-5(b). If it finds no such reasonable cause, the
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/58
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Commission is directed to dismiss the charge. If it does find
reasonable cause, the Commission shall "endeavor to eliminate [the]
alleged unlawful employment
Page 493 U. S. 191
practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and
persuasion." Ibid. If attempts at voluntary resolution fail, the
Commission may bring an action against the employer. § 2000e5(f)(1). [Footnote 4]
To enable the Commission to make informed decisions at each stage
of the enforcement process, § 2000e-8(a) confers a broad right of
access to relevant evidence:
"[T]he Commission or its designated representative shall at all
reasonable times have access to, for the purposes of examination, and
the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated . . .
that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by [the Act]
and is relevant to the charge under investigation."
If an employer refuses to provide this information voluntarily, the Act
authorizes the Commission to issue a subpoena and to seek an order
enforcing it. § 2000e-9 (incorporating 29 U.S.C. § 161).
On their face, § 2000e-8(a) and § 2000e-9 do not carve out any
special privilege relating to peer review materials, despite the fact
that Congress undoubtedly was aware, when it extended Title VII's
coverage, of the potential burden that access to such material might
create. Moreover, we have noted previously that, when a court is
asked to enforce a Commission subpoena, its responsibility is to
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"satisfy itself that the charge is valid and that the material requested
is 'relevant' to the charge . . . and more generally to assess any
contentions by the employer that the demand for information is too
indefinite or has been made for an illegitimate purpose."
It is not then to determine "whether the charge of discrimination is
well founded' or `verifiable.'" EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 466
U. S. 72, n. 26.
The University concedes that the information sought by the
Commission in this case passes the relevance test set
Page 493 U. S. 192
forth in Shell Oil. Tr. of Oral Arg. 6. Petitioner argues, nevertheless,
that Title VII affirmatively grants courts the discretion to require
more than relevance in order to protect tenure-review documents.
Although petitioner recognizes that Title VII gives the Commission
broad "power to seek access to all evidence that may be relevant to
the charge under investigation,'" Brief for Petitioner 38 (emphasis
added), it contends that Title VII's subpoena enforcement provisions
do not give the Commission an unqualified right to acquire such
evidence. Id. at 38-41. This interpretation simply cannot be
reconciled with the plain language of the text of § 2000e-8(a), which
states that the Commission "shall . . . have access" to "relevant"
evidence (emphasis added). The provision can be read only as giving
the Commission a right to obtain that evidence, not a mere license to
seek it.
Although the text of the access provisions thus provides no privilege,
Congress did address situations in which an employer may have an
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/58
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interest in the confidentiality of its records. The same § 2000e-8
which gives the Commission access to any evidence relevant to its
investigation also makes it
"unlawful for any officer or employee of the Commission to make
public in any manner whatever any information obtained by the
Commission pursuant to its authority under this section prior to the
institution of any proceeding"
under the Act. A violation of this provision subjects the employee to
criminal penalties. Ibid. To be sure, the protection of confidentiality
that § 2000-8(e) provides is less than complete. [Footnote 5] But this,
if anything, weakens petitioner's argument. Congress apparently
considered the issue of confidentiality, and it provided a modicum of
protection. Petitioner urges us to go further than Congress thought
necessary to safeguard that value, that is, to strike the balance
differently from the one Congress adopted. Petitioner, however,
Page 493 U. S. 193
does not offer any persuasive justification for that suggestion.
We readily agree with petitioner that universities and colleges play
significant roles in American society. Nor need we question, at this
point, petitioner's assertion that confidentiality is important to the
proper functioning of the peer review process under which many
academic institutions operate. The costs that ensue from disclosure,
however, constitute only one side of the balance. As Congress has
recognized, the costs associated with racial and sexual discrimination
in institutions of higher learning are very substantial. Few would
deny that ferreting out this kind of invidious discrimination is a great
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if not compelling governmental interest. Often, as even petitioner
seems to admit, see Reply Brief for Petitioner 15, disclosure of peer
review materials will be necessary in order for the Commission to
determine whether illegal discrimination has taken place. Indeed, if
there is a "smoking gun" to be found that demonstrates
discrimination in tenure decisions, it is likely to be tucked away in
peer review files. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
expressed it this way:
"Clearly, an alleged perpetrator of discrimination cannot be allowed
to pick and choose the evidence which may be necessary for an
agency investigation. There may be evidence of discriminatory intent
and of pretext in the confidential notes and memorand[a] which the
[college] seeks to protect. Likewise, confidential material pertaining
to other candidates for tenure in a similar timeframe may
demonstrate that persons with lesser qualifications were granted
tenure or that some pattern of discrimination appears. . . . [T]he peer
review material itself must be investigated to determine whether the
evaluations are based in discrimination and whether they are
reflected in the tenure decision."
EEOC v. Franklin and Marshall College, 775 F.2d at 116 (emphasis
deleted).
Page 493 U. S. 194
Moreover, we agree with the EEOC that the adoption of a
requirement that the Commission demonstrate a "specific reason for
disclosure," see Brief for Petitioner 46, beyond a showing of
relevance, would place a substantial litigation-producing obstacle in
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the way of the Commission's efforts to investigate and remedy alleged
discrimination. Cf. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. at 408 U. S.
705-706. A university faced with a disclosure request might well
utilize the privilege in a way that frustrates the EEOC's mission. We
are reluctant to
"place a potent weapon in the hands of employers who have no
interest in complying voluntarily with the Act, who wish instead to
delay as long as possible investigations by the EEOC."
EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. at 466 U. S. 81.
Acceptance of petitioner's claim would also lead to a wave of similar
privilege claims by other employers who play significant roles in
furthering speech and learning in society. What of writers, publishers,
musicians, lawyers? It surely is not unreasonable to believe, for
example, that confidential peer reviews play an important part in
partnership determinations at some law firms. We perceive no
limiting principle in petitioner's argument. Accordingly, we stand
behind the breakwater Congress has established: unless specifically
provided otherwise in the statute, the EEOC may obtain "relevant"
evidence. Congress has made the choice. If it dislikes the result, it of
course may revise the statute.
Finally, we see nothing in our precedents that supports petitioner's
claim. In United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683 (1974), upon which
petitioner relies, we recognized a qualified privilege for Presidential
communications. It is true that, in fashioning this privilege, we noted
the importance of confidentiality in certain contexts:
"Human experience teaches that those who expect public
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dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a
concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment
of the decisionmaking process."
Id. at 418 U. S. 705.
Page 493 U. S. 195
But the privilege we recognized in Nixon was grounded in the
separation of powers between the Branches of the Federal
Government.
"[T]he privilege can be said to derive from the supremacy of each
branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties. Certain
powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated powers;
the protection of the confidentiality of Presidential communications
has similar constitutional underpinnings."
Id. at 418 U. S. 705-706 (footnote omitted). As we discuss below,
petitioner's claim of privilege lacks similar constitutional foundation.
In Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U. S. 211 (1979), the
Court recognized the privileged nature of grand jury proceedings. We
noted there that the rule of secrecy dated back to the 17th century,
was imported into our federal common law, and was eventually
codified in Fed.Rule. Crim.Proc. 6(e) as "an integral part of our
criminal justice system." Id. at 441 U. S. 218, n. 9. Similarly, in Clark
v. United States, 289 U. S. 1, 289 U. S. 13 (1933), the Court recognized
a privilege for the votes and deliberations of a petit jury, noting that
references to the privilege "bear with them the implications of an
immemorial tradition." More recently, in NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck &
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/58
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Co., 421 U. S. 132 (1975), we construed an exception to the Freedom
of Information Act in which Congress had incorporated a
well-established privilege for deliberative intra-agency documents. A
privilege for peer review materials has no similar historical or
statutory basis.
B
As noted above, petitioner characterizes its First Amendment claim as
one of "academic freedom." Petitioner begins its argument by
focusing our attention upon language in prior cases acknowledging
the crucial role universities play in the dissemination of ideas in our
society and recognizing "academic freedom" as a "special concern of
the First Amendment." Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U. S. 589,
385 U. S. 603 (1967). In that case, the Court said:
Page 493 U. S. 196
"Our Nation is deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom,
which is of transcendent value to all of us, and not merely to the
teachers concerned."
See also Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485, 342 U. S. 511
(1952) (academic freedom is central to "the pursuit of truth which the
First Amendment is designed to protect" (dissenting opinion of
Douglas, J.)). Petitioner places special reliance on Justice
Frankfurter's opinion, concurring in the result, in Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U. S. 234, 354 U. S. 263 (1957), where the Justice
recognized that one of "four essential freedoms" that a university
possesses under the First Amendment is the right to "determine for
itself on academic grounds who may teach ."
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(Emphasis added.)
Petitioner contends that it exercises this right of determining "on
academic grounds who may teach" through the process of awarding
tenure. A tenure system, asserts petitioner, determines what the
university will look like over time. "In making tenure decisions,
therefore, a university is doing nothing less than shaping its own
identity." Brief for Petitioner 19.
Petitioner next maintains that the peer review process is the most
important element in the effective operation of a tenure system. A
properly functioning tenure system requires the faculty to obtain
candid and detailed written evaluations of the candidate's
scholarship, both from the candidate's peers at the university and
from scholars at other institutions. These evaluations, says petitioner,
traditionally have been provided with express or implied assurances
of confidentiality. It is confidentiality that ensures candor and
enables an institution to make its tenure decisions on the basis of
valid academic criteria.
Building from these premises, petitioner claims that requiring the
disclosure of peer review evaluations on a finding of mere relevance
will undermine the existing process of awarding tenure, and
therefore will result in a significant infringement of petitioner's First
Amendment right of academic
Page 493 U. S. 197
freedom. As more and more peer evaluations are disclosed to the
EEOC and become public, a "chilling effect" on candid evaluations
and discussions of candidates will result. And as the quality of peer
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/58
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review evaluations declines, tenure committees will no longer be able
to rely on them.
"This will work to the detriment of universities, as less qualified
persons achieve tenure, causing the quality of instruction and
scholarship to decline."
Brief for Petitioner 35. Compelling disclosure of materials
"also will result in divisiveness and tension, placing strain on faculty
relations and impairing the free interchange of ideas that is a
hallmark of academic freedom."
Ibid. The prospect of these deleterious effects on American colleges
and universities, concludes petitioner, compels recognition of a First
Amendment privilege.
In our view, petitioner's reliance on the so-called academic freedom
cases is somewhat misplaced. In those cases, government was
attempting to control or direct the content of the speech engaged in
by the university or those affiliated with it. In Sweezy, for example,
the Court invalidated the conviction of a person found in contempt
for refusing to answer questions about the content of a lecture he had
delivered at a state university. Similarly, in Keyishian, the Court
invalidated a network of state laws that required public employees,
including teachers at state universities, to make certifications with
respect to their membership in the Communist Party. When, in those
cases, the Court spoke of "academic freedom" and the right to
determine on "academic grounds who may teach" the Court was
speaking in reaction to content-based regulation. See Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. at 354 U. S. 250 (plurality opinion discussing
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problems that result from imposition of a "strait jacket upon the
intellectual leaders in our colleges and universities"); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. at 385 U. S. 603 (discussing dangers that
are present when a "pall of orthodoxy" is cast "over the classroom").
Page 493 U. S. 198
Fortunately, we need not define today the precise contours of any
academic freedom right against governmental attempts to influence
the content of academic speech through the selection of faculty or by
other means, [Footnote 6] because petitioner does not allege that the
Commission's subpoenas are intended to or will in fact direct the
content of university discourse toward or away from particular
subjects or points of view. Instead, as noted above, petitioner claims
that the "quality of instruction and scholarship [will] decline" as a
result of the burden EEOC subpoenas place on the peer review
process.
Also, the cases upon which petitioner places emphasis involved direct
infringements on the asserted right to "determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach." In Keyishian, for example,
government was attempting to substitute its teaching employment
criteria for those already in place at the academic institutions,
directly and completely usurping the discretion of each institution. In
contrast, the EEOC subpoena at issue here effects no such
usurpation. The Commission is not providing criteria that petitioner
must use in selecting teachers. Nor is it preventing the University
from using any criteria it may wish to use, except those -- including
race, sex, and national origin -- that are proscribed under Title VII.
[Footnote 7] In keeping with Title VII's
https://thekeep.eiu.edu/jcba/vol0/iss12/58
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preservation of employers' remaining freedom of choice, see Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U. S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion),
courts have stressed the importance of avoiding second-guessing of
legitimate academic judgments. This Court itself has cautioned that
"judges . . . asked to review the substance of a genuinely academic
decision . . . should show great respect for the faculty's professional
judgment."
Regents of University of Michigan v. Ewing, 474 U. S. 214, 474 U. S.
225 (1985). Nothing we say today should be understood as a retreat
from this principle of respect for legitimate academic
decisionmaking.
That the burden of which the University complains is neither
content-based nor direct does not necessarily mean that petitioner
has no valid First Amendment claim. Rather, it means only that
petitioner's claim does not fit neatly within any right of academic
freedom that could be derived from the cases on which petitioner
relies. In essence, petitioner asks us to recognize an expanded right of
academic freedom to protect confidential peer review materials from
disclosure. Although we are sensitive to the effects that contentneutral government action may have on speech, see, e.g., Heffron v.
International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U. S. 640,
452 U. S. 647-648 (1981), and believe that burdens that are less than
direct may sometimes pose First Amendment concerns, see, e.g.,
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958), we think
the First Amendment cannot be extended to embrace petitioner's
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claim.
First, by comparison with the cases in which we have found a
cognizable First Amendment claim, the infringement the University
complains of is extremely attenuated. To repeat, it argues that the
First Amendment is infringed by disclosure of peer review materials
because disclosure undermines the confidentiality which is central to
the peer review process, and this in turn is central to the tenure
process, which in turn is the means by which petitioner seeks to
exercise
Page 493 U. S. 200
its asserted academic freedom right of choosing who will teach. To
verbalize the claim is to recognize how distant the burden is from the
asserted right.
Indeed, if the University's attenuated claim were accepted, many
other generally applicable laws might also be said to infringe the First
Amendment. In effect, petitioner says no more than that disclosure of
peer review materials makes it more difficult to acquire information
regarding the "academic grounds" on which petitioner wishes to base
its tenure decisions. But many laws make the exercise of First
Amendment rights more difficult. For example, a university cannot
claim a First Amendment violation simply because it may be subject
to taxation or other government regulation, even though such
regulation might deprive the university of revenue it needs to bid for
professors who are contemplating working for other academic
institutions or in industry. We doubt that the peer review process is
any more essential in effectuating the right to determine "who may
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teach" than is the availability of money. Cf. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.
S. 1, 424 U. S. 19 (discussing how money is sometimes necessary to
effectuate First Amendment rights).
In addition to being remove and attenuated, the injury to academic
freedom claimed by petitioner is also speculative. As the EEOC points
out, confidentiality is not the norm in all peer review systems. See,
e.g., G. Bednash, The Relationship Between Access and Selectivity in
Tenure Review Outcomes (1989) (unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation,
University of Maryland). Moreover, some disclosure of peer
evaluations would take place even if petitioner's "special necessity"
test were adopted. Thus, the "chilling effect" petitioner fears is at
most only incrementally worsened by the absence of a privilege.
Finally, we are not so ready as petitioner seems to be to assume the
worst about those in the academic community. Although it is possible
that some evaluators may become less candid as the possibility of
disclosure increases, others may simply ground their evaluations in
specific examples
Page 493 U. S. 201
and illustrations in order to deflect potential claims of bias or
unfairness. Not all academics will hesitate to stand up and be counted
when they evaluate their peers.
The case we decide today in many respects is similar to Branzburg v.
Hayes, supra. In Branzburg, the Court rejected the notion that,
under the First Amendment, a reporter could not be required to
appear or to testify as to information obtained in confidence without
a special showing that the reporter's testimony was necessary.
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Petitioners there, like petitioner here, claimed that requiring
disclosure of information collected in confidence would inhibit the
free flow of information in contravention of First Amendment
principles. In the courts of rejecting the First Amendment argument,
this Court noted that
"the First Amendment does not invalidate every incidental burdening
of the press that may result from the enforcement of civil or criminal
statutes of general applicability."
408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 682. We also indicated a reluctance to recognize
a constitutional privilege where it was
"unclear how often and to what extent informers are actually
deterred from furnishing information when newsmen are forced to
testify before a grand jury."
Id. at 408 U. S. 693. See also Herbert v. Lando, 441 U. S. 153, 441 U.
S. 174 (1979). We were unwilling then, as we are today, "to embark
the judiciary on a long and difficult journey to . . . an uncertain
destination." 408 U.S. at 408 U. S. 703. [Footnote 8]
Because we conclude that the EEOC subpoena process does not
infringe any First Amendment right enjoyed by petitioner, the EEOC
need not demonstrate any special justification to sustain the
constitutionality of Title VII as applied to tenure peer review
materials in general or to the subpoena involved in this case.
Accordingly, we need not address the
Page 493 U. S. 202
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Commission's alternative argument that any infringement of
petitioner's First Amendment rights is permissible because of the
substantial relation between the Commission's request and the
overriding and compelling state interest in eradicating invidious
discrimination. [Footnote 9]
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
It is so ordered.
[Footnote 1]
Three days before the stated 2-day period expired, petitioner brought
suit against the EEOC in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and an
order quashing the subpoena. App. 4. The Pennsylvania District
Court declined to follow its controlling court's announced "first-filed"
rule, which counsels the stay or dismissal of an action that is
duplicative of a previously filed suit in another federal court. See
Crosley Corp. v. Hazeltime Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 929 (CA3 1941), cert.
denied, 315 U.S. 813 (1942); Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinea v.
Insurance Co. of North America, 651 F.2d 877, 887, n. 10 (CA3 1981),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1105 (1982). This declination, however, was
upheld by the Third Circuit. See 850 F.2d 969, 972 (1988). Since the
applicability of the "first-filed" rule to the facts of this case is not a
question on which we granted certiorari, we do not address it.
[Footnote 2]
The Court of Appeals did not rule on the question whether the
Commission's subpoena permits petitioner to engage in any redaction
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of the disputed records before producing them, because the District
Court had not fully considered that issue. The Third Circuit therefore
ordered that the case be remanded for further consideration of
possible redaction. See 850 F.2d at 982.
[Footnote 3]
See, e.g., 118 Cong.Rec. 311 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Ervin); id. at 946
(remarks of Sen. Allen); id. at 4919 (remarks of Sen. Ervin).
[Footnote 4]
Similarly, the charging party may bring an action after it obtains a
"right-to-sue" letter from the Commission. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
[Footnote 5]
The prohibition on Commission disclosure does not apply, for
example, to the charging party. See EEOC v. Associated Dry Goods
Corp., 449 U. S. 590, 449 U. S. 598-604 (1981).
[Footnote 6]
Obvious First Amendment problems would arise where government
attempts to direct the content of speech at private universities. Such
content-based regulation of private speech traditionally has carried
with it a heavy burden of justification. See, e.g., Police Dept. of
Chicago v. Mosely, 408 U. S. 92, 408 U. S. 95, 408 U. S. 98-99
(1972). Where, as was the situation in the academic-freedom cases,
government attempts to direct the content of speech at public
educational institutions, complicated First Amendment issues are
presented, because government is simultaneously both speaker and
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regulator. Cf. Meese v. Keene, 481 U. S. 465, 481 U. S. 484, n. 18
(1987) (citing Block v. Meese, 253 U.S.App.D.C. 317, 327-328, 793
F.2d 1303, 1313-1314 (1986)). See generally, M. Yudof, When
Government Speaks (1983).
[Footnote 7]
Petitioner does not argue in this case that race, sex, and national
origin constitute "academic grounds" for the purposes of its claimed
First Amendment right to academic freedom. Cf. Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 438 U. S. 312-313
(1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
[Footnote 8]
In Branzburg, we recognized that the bad faith exercise of grand jury
powers might raise First Amendment concerns. 408 U.S. at 408 U. S.
707. The same is true of EEOC subpoena powers. See EEOC v. Shell
Oil Co., 466 U. S. 54, 466 U. S. 72, n. 26 (1984). There is no allegation
or indication of any such abuse by the Commission in this case.
[Footnote 9]
We also do not consider the question, not passed upon by the Court
of Appeals, whether the District Court's enforcement of the
Commission's subpoena will allow petitioner to redact information
from the contested materials before disclosing them. See n 2, supra.
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informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments,
verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the
accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site
or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.
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